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Cruz Caridad Bueno & Errol A. Henderson

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BARGAINING OR BACKLASH? EVIDENCE ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Cruz Caridad Bueno and Errol A. Henderson

ABSTRACT

This essay explores the role of economic, political, and social factors in the incidence of intimate partner violence (IPV). It considers the extent to which two prominent theses on the determinants of IPV – (1) the household bargaining model (HBM), and (2) the male backlash model (MBM) – best explain this phenomenon in the case of the Dominican Republic. Drawing on the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which differentiates between physical and sexual IPV, results from logistic regressions reveal that the HBM better explains physical IPV, while the MBM better predicts sexual IPV. Further, the HBM does better accounting for IPV among wealthier women, while the MBM best explains IPV among poorer women. The findings suggest the need to reconsider broad programs and policies intended to prevent and ameliorate IPV in the Dominican Republic, and to implement targeted initiatives focusing on the economic factors motivating them.

KEYWORDS

Intimate partner violence, household bargaining model, male backlash model, Dominican Republic, Caribbean and Latin America

JEL Codes: B54, J12, 054

INTRODUCTION

Violence against women and girls is one of the most persistent human rights violations in the world (Krug et al. 2002; García-Moreno et al. 2005; Engle Merry 2006; Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara 2008). An emerging literature in the field of development studies argues that domestic violence, or intimate partner violence (IPV), not only reflects a victimization of an individual woman, but its pervasiveness throughout many states is indicative of a broader assault on women's human rights. Moreover, IPV has been found to adversely affect human development and economic

growth (Panda and Agarwal 2005; Agarwal and Panda 2007; Duvvury et al. 2013; Bhattacharya 2015; Oduro, Deere, and Catanzarite 2015). Although IPV is often considered a consequence of persistent masculinist traditions, it is increasingly viewed as having roots in the broader socioeconomic and political contexts of the countries in which it occurs. Recent literature on IPV is bifurcated between studies focusing on advanced industrialized societies and those focusing on poor, agriculturally based ones (Macmillan and Gartner 1999; González-Brenes 2004; Aizer 2010; Finnoff 2010). Less common are studies that systematically examine IPV in “intermediate societies” – those that are neither rich nor poor, which include many Caribbean and Latin American countries. These countries are characterized by high levels of IPV, which often is assumed to result from cultural factors such as machismo or masculinity. Moreover, these intermediate societies have relatively developed institutions of civil society, which may provide women with better exit options in cases of IPV. That is, they may provide prevention and intervention services for IPV victims. They also have attributes of poor countries, such as persistent low wages for women’s work, weak institutions of gender equity, and overt expressions of gender bias, which all contribute to limit the ability of survivors of IPV to leave abusive environments.

Among intermediate states, the Dominican Republic (DR) is particularly distinctive. For example, although firmly situated among middle-income developing countries with respect to socioeconomic development indicators, during the years 2006–12 the DR averaged an annual economic growth rate of 4 percent; and from 2012 to 2016, it was 4.5 percent, which is a faster rate of economic growth than the regional average for Latin America (Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean [ECLAC] 2016). In contrast, however, it has a higher poverty rate, lower life expectancy for men and women, and lower literacy rates than the regional average for Latin America. Significantly, given the focus of this study, the DR has the highest rate of femicide in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the sixth highest rate in the world (Esplugues et al. 2010; Amnesty International 2012). According to its nationwide Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2007 (Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demográficos [CESDEM] 2007), as many as half of Dominican women surveyed had experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence at the hands of their domestic partner. In light of this, the DR is an important case study for the analysis of the economic, political, and social factors that contribute to IPV. In this study, we examine the relationship between IPV and women’s economic activity, political engagement, and broader sociodemographic factors. Specifically, we test the extent to which two prominent theses, the household bargaining model (HBM) and the male backlash model (MBM), account for the incidence of IPV in the DR.

The HBM postulates that when women have more resources, or greater potential opportunities for income generating activities, they can bargain for better outcomes in the household. Hence, they experience less IPV. According to the HBM, increased economic opportunities for women are expected to decrease the likelihood of IPV, while decreased economic opportunities are expected to increase the likelihood of IPV.

In contrast, the MBM assumes that men employ IPV when they perceive that the gender hierarchy in the household is being challenged or destabilized, such as when a wife is employed while the husband is unemployed. Thus, the MBM assumes that increased economic opportunities for women relative to men increase the likelihood of IPV.

The results from logistic regression analyses provide support for the HBM when the dependent variable is aggregate IPV (that is, the combination of physical and sexual IPV) or physical IPV, specifically; however, the MBM better accounts for sexual IPV. These results are further complicated when we contrast the experiences of rich women with those of poor women. We find that the HBM does better at predicting IPV among asset-rich women, while the MBM better accounts for IPV among asset-poor women. The findings demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between different types of IPV, while appreciating the impact of class on prospective interventions to ameliorate IPV in intermediate states such as the DR.

THE DR AND IPV

The DR presents a distinct social, cultural, and economic setting for testing the HBM and the MBM. For example, in 1997 the government of the DR issued Law 24-97, which decreed that domestic violence was punishable by law; nevertheless, femicide and IPV remain prominent in the country. In fact, as noted above, the DR is one of the most femicide-prone states in the world. Not surprisingly, gender hierarchies are entrenched in its social norms and institutions; but the DR is also a country of expanded economic opportunities for women. For example, during the “Lost Decade” of the 1980s, the DR shifted to a neoliberal growth strategy that saw male unemployment skyrocket and the number of poor and near-poor households increase dramatically. In this context, employment opportunities for women expanded in the key sectors of tourism and manufacturing; and women pursued these opportunities to provide for their households (Deere et al. 1990; Elson 1991; Espinal 1995). By the early 2000s, Dominican women continued to be key economic actors in the country’s labor market as both consumers and workers, and Lambert (2009) estimated women’s labor force participation rate in the DR in 2007 at 39 percent. In addition, Dominican women are considered highly mobile, independent, and are educated at higher rates than men (Lambert 2009).

Since inheritance is the greatest purveyor of wealth cross-generationally, it is important to note that in the DR, inheritance is split equally among children, regardless of gender or marital status of birth parents (Deere and León 2001). Nevertheless, men are still perceived to be the final decision makers in the household even when they are not the primary financial providers. As Helen I. Safa (1995) argues, the myth of the male breadwinner holds throughout the Caribbean and Latin American cultures despite women being viewed as ultimately responsible for providing for the household regardless of the male partner's economic contribution. To put it simply, it is the responsibility of the woman or girlfriend or mother or wife to "put food on the table" and to maintain and provide for the household (Chant and Craske 2003). The myth of the male breadwinner compounds women's burden of being ultimately responsible for household provisions because it justifies and sustains the notion that working women are only supplemental wage earners, which, in turn, helps to suppress women's wages and undermine their ability to provide for themselves and their dependents.

The DR provides an excellent case study in which to test if expanded economic opportunities in the public sphere afforded by the DR's economic development have provided women with positive externalities that impact their physical well-being, specifically their being subjected to IPV. Or if, instead, women suffer what Bina Agarwal and Pradeep Panda (2007: 359) call the "perverse effects" of development, in which the expansion of economic opportunities creates negative externalities for women's experience of IPV. For example, Pradeep Panda and Bina Agarwal (2005) argue that women who experience marital violence have lower levels of self-confidence and are at greater risk for injuries. Either or both of these factors may reduce a woman's earning potential, productive capacity, contributions to household income, and contributions to market activity. Our analysis of IPV in the DR seeks to help determine whether it is these perverse effects of development that are generating IPV through "male backlash" in the manner hypothesized by the MBM, or if it is the leverage exerted by a woman's ability to exercise meaningful exit options that better accounts for the incidence of IPV. In evaluating the ability of these models to explicate the processes we observe in the DR, we consider the incidence of IPV in the context of additional economic, political, and social factors, as well. Scholars, activists, and analysts seek to determine which variables are associated with the incidence of IPV in order to provide policies that promote women's freedom from IPV both for intrinsic and instrumental reasons. The former is done out of concern for the promotion of women's right to be safe and secure in their own person and most intimate dwelling, and to denounce IPV as morally wrong. The latter is out of concern to reduce healthcare costs associated with IPV, to avert associated productivity and wage losses, and as a result, to promote economic development to

foster economic growth (Krug et al. 2002; González-Brenes 2004; García-Moreno et al. 2005; Panda and Agarwal 2005; Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara 2008; Aizer 2010; Finnoff 2010; Duvvury et al. 2013).

CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE CORRELATES OF IPV

The household is an important site of economic and political exchange for feminist scholars. Feminist scholarship challenged the public/private divide as largely contrived. As a result, feminist economists reverse the conceptual and analytical lens of traditional economics. They study the household, not as conventional economic theory would posit it – as a site of pure altruism, where the husband (breadwinner) is a benevolent actor maximizing the well-being of the whole family (Becker 1981) – but as a site of contestation, compromise, and cooperation, where relative power based on available outside opportunities determine household members' well-being, and the level of conflict or cooperation within it. For feminist economists, given that the household is both a site of bargaining and the locus of IPV, it is important to determine to what extent economic factors influence bargaining outcomes in the home with respect to IPV.

As noted above, the HBM and MBM focus on the economic determinants of IPV. They suggest rival propositions on the factors associated with the incidence of IPV.¹ Expanding on the brief introduction of the two models discussed above, the simplified version of the HBM argues that a woman's well-being in the household is more a function of her ability to bargain with her husband – based on her actual and potential outside economic opportunities and resources – and is less dependent on the altruism of her husband. Therefore, a wife's economic resources are a more potent predictor of IPV than sociocultural factors. Specifically, the HBM predicts that the greater a woman's real and potential resources, education, capital, and income-generating and economic opportunities, the more realistic her exit option and, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the likelihood that she will exercise it if she faces a threat or incidence of IPV. The extent of a woman's exit option is expected to influence her bargaining position in the household in two major ways. First, it allows her to use outside opportunities as leverage in the household to bargain with her husband for better welfare outcomes in the home. Feminist economists have shown empirically that when women have more real and potential opportunities, they generally fare better than women who do not have them. For example, such women spend less time on housework; they have more freedom of movement, they have greater household decision-making ability, and they have lower fertility rates. Second, because both wife and husband are aware of each other's exit options, the husband is expected to be more willing to negotiate, compromise, and cooperate with his wife if her exit option

is high. The greater a wife's ability to take care of herself financially, the better the behavior of the husband toward his wife. Hence, a women's exit option – if she is able to provide for herself and any dependents – serves as a deterrent to the husband's misbehavior (England 2003).

For example, in their groundbreaking study on the impact of women's property ownership on domestic violence, Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that women who own land or a house are significantly less likely to experience marital violence – either emotional or physical – than women who do not own property. As a result, the authors advocate the importance of “right to housing” and “right to land” campaigns as means of improving women's lives by providing them a viable exit option from violent husbands thereby reducing their risk of IPV. The authors also find that women who reported having regular employment have a lower likelihood of experiencing IPV. Focusing on household survey data from Kerala, India, Carmen Diana Deere and Cheryl R. Doss find empirical support for their argument that “assets improve the lives of women who own and control them” (2006: 34). Similarly, Anna Aizer (2010) found that as the gender wage gap declined in California as labor demand increased in female-dominant sectors, the number of women admitted to hospitals for physical assaults decreased. Hence the HBM suggests the following:

Proposition 1.1: The more economic resources, and the more potential and actual income-generating opportunities a woman has, the less likely she is to experience IPV.

Although the HBM suggests that a woman's acquisition of economic resources and income-generating activity relative to her husband will translate into a lower probability of her experiencing IPV, the logic of the HBM implies that a woman's acquisition of a broader range of resources relative to her husband should have a similar effect, as long as they increase the feasibility of her exercising a successful exit strategy. To be sure, expanded economic means are the primary resource that facilitates a woman's exit strategy, but a range of sociodemographic factors may operate similarly. For example, increased years of education, living in an urban area where there are more work opportunities, or if the respondent is the household head, might increase a woman's opportunities independent of her husband. Each of these increases the feasibility of her exit option and, as a result, increases a woman's bargaining position relative to her husband, translating into better welfare outcomes in the household, namely, a lower likelihood of IPV. We refer to this perspective that focuses on largely non-economic resource factors that strengthen a woman's exit option, as the augmented version of the HBM. Further, we envision women's participation in the political realm as an extension of her outside opportunities and resources – performing a corollary function to the

expanded economic resources that the basic HBM focuses on. Therefore, such expanded sociopolitical resources should, in turn, strengthen a woman's bargaining position, as well. It follows that in the augmented version of the HBM, women's participation in political organizations and in women's organizations should also result in a decreased probability of IPV. The augmented HBM suggests the following proposition:

Proposition 1.2: The more non-economic resources, and the more potential and actual non-economic opportunities a woman has, the less likely she is to experience IPV.

In contrast to the HBM, the MBM argues that as a woman's economic position or economic prospects improve relative to those of her husband, so does her likelihood of experiencing IPV. The causal assumption of the MBM is that a woman's increased economic potential relative to her partner may be viewed by the husband as a challenge to the masculinist norms that reinforce male dominance in the household (Engle Merry 2009); therefore, the husband employs IPV to reassert his dominance in the household. Angela Hattery noted that "one of the battering 'triggers' for men is feeling that their masculinity is threatened" such that "when men feel emasculated they will often try to reassert their masculinity through violence" (2009: 8). Thus, from the perspective of the MBM, when a woman acquires greater economic potential or resources than the male partner or spouse, the latter is more likely to use force and violence to (re)assert power and control over his partner, and this retribution constitutes the "backlash" (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). Support for the MBM is provided in Catherine Ruth Finnoff's findings from post-civil war Rwanda, where "women who [we]re employed but whose husbands [we]re not experienced more sexual violence" (2010: 7).² The MBM, then, emphasizes the disruption of the sociocultural context that changed economic opportunities might create for households. The MBM suggests the greater impact of sociocultural than economic factors in IPV. Put differently, it reflects what Agarwal and Panda call the unintended and perverse effects of development strategies (2007). For example, economic restructuring and liberalization in many developing countries provide women with new opportunities for paid work, which has the potential to provide them with greater economic autonomy, while simultaneously decreasing income-generating opportunities for men who held positions prior to the restructuring. However, entrenched gender norms in a changing economic context may encourage a husband to pursue violence against his wife as a way to assert his power and demonstrate his control over her (Engle Merry 2009). Thus, the MBM suggests that:

Proposition 2.1: The greater the economic resources of a wife relative to her husband, the greater the likelihood that she will experience IPV.

Just as in the case of the HBM, the logic of the MBM suggests an augmented version, as well. In the basic version of the MBM, IPV is assumed to be largely a function of the relative income positions of the couple, such that when a wife makes more money than her husband, the MBM predicts that the wife is more likely to experience IPV. We may extend the logic of the MBM to include non-economic factors that perform related functions as well. Among these are many of the sociopolitical variables discussed above in Proposition 1.2; especially those that appear to provide women sociopolitical resources such as through participation in political or women's organizations and support groups. In addition, women's activity in such organizations may allow them to participate as a political actor in the public sphere – the latter often viewed as a principally “male domain.” Such activity on the part of women may provide a rationale for men attempting to impose their domination, and in this way, these non-economic factors may generate the “backlash” that the MBM observes for economic factors. The augmented MBM suggests:

Proposition 2.2: The more non-economic resources and the more potential and actual non-economic opportunities a woman has, the more likely she is to experience IPV.

Given the contrasting propositions of the two perspectives, the DR provides an interesting case study in which to determine whether the HBM or MBM better accounts for IPV. The findings from our analyses will not only allow us to determine which model best explains the patterns of IPV in the Caribbean, but given that the DR is an intermediate state, they will allow us to discern to what extent the HBM and MBM is context dependent. The DR is useful in determining the latter, given the much wider disparities of wealth in intermediate states than may be observed in analyses of states at either the highest or lowest levels of development. For example, despite economic growth during the last two decades, the DR has a high level of income inequality – its Gini coefficient in 2012 of 0.46 placed it near the top one-fourth of countries reporting the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income (CIA 2012). The richest (as in, top or first) quintile receives 58.6 percent of total income; the next highest quintile, 19.8 percent; the middle quintile, 12.8 percent; the next quintile, 7.5 percent; and the poorest (as in, bottom or fifth) quintile receives 1.3 percent of GDP (Hammill 2005). In the case of such extreme income inequality, one would expect that the services – allocated by the market or the state – provided to women experiencing IPV would be heavily skewed to those with greater economic resources. If this situation actually obtains, then the factors assumed to be operative in the HBM would seem to be particularly salient for richer rather than poorer women. Therefore, women in the upper income quintiles, with more opportunities and access

to resources, would have more viable exit options when confronted with a violent spouse as compared to poorer women. This bias is exacerbated in countries such as the DR, which have very few publicly provided resources for survivors of IPV. Therefore, to capture the effect of class differences on IPV, we also test:

Proposition 3: The HBM will better predict the correlation between economic factors and IPV for asset-rich women.

In what follows, we outline the research design that we utilize to test these five propositions and assess the correlates of IPV in the DR.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The analyses draw on data from the DHS for the DR conducted in 2007. The DHS is a household-level survey administered by Macro International in many developing nations including the DR, where it is conducted in conjunction with the Dominican government, the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the Global Fund. DHS data are useful in evaluating the propositions not only because of the breadth of variables they examine (such as economic, political, and demographic factors), but also because they allow us to distinguish between physical and sexual IPV. We employ a subsample of 1,820 women – ages 15–49, currently married or cohabitating – who were randomly selected to participate in the domestic violence module of the DHS survey. Of the 1,820 respondents, 626 women are from rural areas and 1,194 from urban areas. We include data on women who are married or partnered – in traditional marriages or consensual unions, or women who have partners but currently are not living with them. The domestic violence module is an addition to the DHS survey, which collects household- and individual-level data from both women and a subsample of their male partners. Using the Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus 1990), women were asked questions to determine their experiences with physical and sexual IPV in the household.³ The reported instances of IPV were measured as discrete variables, and women were asked both if they had experienced any of these forms of violence in their lives and if they had experienced any of these forms of violence in the last twelve months.

DHS data are useful because they are random, nationally representative, and collected at the household level; however, the DHS has several limitations. Most notably, it does not collect race or ethnicity of respondents; and in data of this type, there are almost always concerns with underreporting of IPV.⁴ Nevertheless, the DHS is a carefully constructed survey instrument administered throughout the developing

world. Descriptive statistics derived from the DHS are reported in the cross-tabs in Table 1, and an initial review reveals several interesting relationships among the economic, political, social, and demographic factors and the incidence of reported IPV.

For example, women who are employed and those who have money for their own use are less likely than unemployed women or those without their own money to experience IPV, in general, or either physical or sexual IPV. These relationships comport with Proposition 1.1 and the HBM. However, women who report making more money than their partners experience physical and sexual IPV at rates higher than their counterparts who make the same or less than their husbands, which supports Proposition 2.1 and the MBM. So even in the cross-tabs, it's evident that aspects of the main versions of both the HBM and the MBM are supported. These initial results also provide support for the augmented versions of both models. For example, more highly educated women report experiencing less IPV, as do women who live in urban areas, and these findings support Proposition 1.2 and the augmented HBM. In contrast, women's membership in political organizations is associated with a higher percentage of both physical and sexual IPV, which supports Proposition 2.2 and the augmented MBM. We also find that women whose husbands drink alcohol often are more likely to report IPV, as are women who report witnessing IPV in childhood, while women whose husbands are nine or more years older report experiencing less IPV than those with smaller age differences. In addition, the impact of class on IPV is consistent with previous findings that poorer women are more likely to experience or report IPV than wealthier women.⁵

Although the results of the cross-tabs provide some interesting preliminary insights into the relationships of interest in our study of IPV in the DR, a more rigorous analysis using multivariate logit regression will allow us to better determine the impact of the main variables of interest controlling for a host of other factors, which reflects Hattery's contention that "IPV consists of individual, structural, and cultural components" (2009: 9).

Logistic regression analyses

The main dependent variables are the general, or aggregate, measure of IPV ($IPV_{General}$); its two components, physical violence ($IPV_{Physical}$) and sexual violence (IPV_{Sexual}). $IPV_{Physical}$ focuses on whether a woman has experienced any sort of physical violence from her domestic partner (that is, if she has answered "yes" to any of the first six questions of the domestic violence module listed in endnote 3); and IPV_{Sexual} focuses on whether a woman has been subjected to forced sexual acts by her domestic partner (that is, if she has answered "yes" to either of the last two questions of the domestic violence module listed in endnote 3). Each of these are binary

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Table 1 Cross-tabulations of variables and types of IPV

| | <i>N</i> | <i>Physical IPV</i> | <i>Sexual IPV</i> |
|---|----------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Respondent has money for own use</i> | | | |
| Yes | 864 | 13.3 (115) | 4.8 (41) |
| No | 956 | 20.5 (196) | 6.6 (63) |
| <i>Employment status</i> | | | |
| Employed | 1492 | 15.5 (231) | 1.67 (25) |
| Unemployed | 328 | 24.4 (80) | 24.1 (79) |
| <i>Earnings relative to partner</i> | | | |
| Respondent makes the same | 215 | 13.9 (30) | 3.7 (8) |
| Respondent makes less | 1296 | 16.5 (214) | 5.4 (70) |
| Respondent makes more | 299 | 22.1 (66) | 8.7 (26) |
| <i>Women's home ownership</i> | | | |
| Yes | 788 | 15.9 (125) | 7.4 (58) |
| No | 1,032 | 18.0 (186) | 4.5 (46) |
| <i>Women's land ownership</i> | | | |
| Yes | 212 | 18.8 (40) | 7.6 (16) |
| No | 1,608 | 16.9 (271) | 5.5 (88) |
| <i>Wealth quintiles</i> | | | |
| Poorest | 324 | 25 (81) | 23.15 (75) |
| Poorer | 437 | 21.3 (93) | 7.6 (33) |
| Middle | 405 | 17.0 (69) | 5.4 (22) |
| Richer | 367 | 10.1 (37) | 3.3 (12) |
| Richest | 287 | 10.8 (31) | 2.8 (8) |
| <i>Member of a women's organization</i> | | | |
| Yes | 105 | 20.0 (21) | 2.9 (3) |
| No | 1,715 | 16.9 (290) | 5.9 (101) |
| <i>Member of a political organization</i> | | | |
| Yes | 41 | 21.9 (9) | 7.3 (3) |
| No | 1,779 | 16.9 (302) | 5.7 (101) |
| <i>Education</i> | | | |
| No education | 50 | 28.0 (14) | 6.0 (3) |
| Primary | 736 | 22.1 (163) | 7.6 (56) |
| Secondary | 612 | 15.4 (94) | 5.9 (36) |
| Higher | 422 | 9.5 (40) | 2.1 (9) |
| <i>Location</i> | | | |
| Urban | 1,194 | 10.39 (124) | 4.94 (59) |
| Rural | 626 | 29.87 (187) | 7.19 (45) |
| <i>Head of household</i> | | | |
| Yes | 393 | 15.5 (61) | 4.1 (16) |
| No | 1,427 | 17.5 (250) | 6.2 (88) |

(Continued).

Table 1 Continued.

| | <i>N</i> | <i>Physical IPV</i> | <i>Sexual IPV</i> |
|-------------------------------------|----------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Spousal age difference</i> | | | |
| AgeDiff ₋₅ | 747 | 18.5 (198) | 5.7 (61) |
| AgeDiff ₅₋₈ | 301 | 15.6 (47) | 6.3 (19) |
| AgeDiff ₉₊ | 446 | 14.8 (66) | 5.4 (24) |
| <i>Husband drinks alcohol often</i> | | | |
| Yes | 145 | 58.6 (85) | 24.8 (36) |
| No | 1,675 | 13.5 (226) | 4.0 (68) |
| <i>Witness IPV</i> | | | |
| Yes | 284 | 27.8 (79) | 7.0 (20) |
| No | 1,536 | 15.1 (232) | 5.5 (84) |

Notes: Main cell values are in percentages; number of responses are in parentheses, $N = 1,820$.

variables that take the value of 1 in the presence of IPV (or its component form), and 0 otherwise.

The main independent variables also include several binary variables: W_{Emp} , which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is working, and 0 otherwise; $W_{\$}$, which takes the value of 1 if the woman reports having money for her own use, and 0 otherwise; $W_{\$\$}$ is coded 1 if the woman respondent earns more money than her husband, and 0 otherwise. *Own Home* is coded 1 if the wife has sole ownership of the home in which the couple resides, and 0 otherwise; and *Own Land* takes the value of 1 if the wife personally owns land, and 0 otherwise. *Poor* is a variable created from the wealth quintiles (based on asset ownership) that the DHS reports; and it takes the value of 1 for those respondents whose income places them in either of the two lowest income quintiles, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, *Rich* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for those respondents whose income places them in either of the two highest income quintiles, and 0 otherwise. *Middle* is coded 1 for those whose income falls in the middle category of the wealth quintiles, and it is omitted from the logit regression analysis as the reference category. *OrgPolitical* – whether a woman belongs to a political organization – takes the value of 1 if the woman belongs to a political organization, 0 otherwise. *OrgWomen*, membership in a women’s organization, takes the value of 1 if the woman is in a women’s organization, 0 otherwise. *Education* is education in years, the minimum being 0 years of education, the maximum being 19 years. *Woman Head* takes the value of 1 if the woman respondent is the head of household, 0 otherwise. *Urban* is 1 if the woman respondent lives in an urban area, 0 if she lives in a rural area. *AgeDiff₋₅* takes the value of 1 if the spousal age difference is 5 years or less, and 0 otherwise. *AgeDiff₅₋₈* is the spousal

age difference that corresponds to couples in which the husband is five to eight years older than the wife and takes the value of 1 if this is the case, 0 otherwise. *AgeDiff*₉₊ takes the value of 1 if the husband is nine or more years older than his wife, 0 otherwise. *Alcohol* takes the value of 1 if the wife reports that her husband drinks alcohol often, 0 otherwise. *WitnessIPV* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the female respondent reports witnessing her father physically abusing her mother (so as to test for the intergenerational transmission of violence), 0 otherwise.

The models are estimated using logit regression, which is appropriate when the dependent variable is dichotomous. The model takes the form:

$$\Pr(y = 1) = \exp(\alpha + \beta x_k + \delta d_k) / (1 + \exp(\alpha + \beta x_k + \delta d_k))$$

where $y = 1$ if the outcome occurs (that is, for “yes” responses to the indicators of IPV), x is a vector of continuous variables, and δ is a vector of dichotomous variables. We report the results of the logistic model in terms of odd ratios, which associate a unit change in x_k to a β_k change in the odds ratio of the outcome, holding all the other independent variables constant. We obtain the odds ratio by taking the exponential of both sides of the equation, which considers the odds of observing a positive outcome ($y = 1$) rather than a negative outcome ($y = 0$):

$$\Omega = \Pr(y = 1) / \Pr(y = 0) = \Pr(y = 1) / 1 - \Pr(y = 1)$$

An odds ratio of x_k greater than 1 indicates an increased probability of the outcome, IPV. Conversely, an odds ratio of x_k less than 1 indicates a decreased probability of the outcome (Long and Freese 2006). The basic model, which varies only with respect to the type of IPV we examine as the outcome, takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(IPV_{General} = 1) = & F(\beta_1 W_{Emp} + \beta_2 W_{\$} + \beta_3 W_{\$\$} + \beta_4 OwnHome \\ & + \beta_5 OwnLand + \beta_6 Poor + \beta_7 Rich + \beta_8 OrgWomen \\ & + \beta_9 OrgPolitical + \beta_{10} Education + \beta_{11} WomanHead \\ & + \beta_{12} Urban + \beta_{13} AgeDiff_{-5} + \beta_{14} AgeDiff_{5-8} \\ & + \beta_{15} AgeDiff_{9+} + \beta_{16} Alcohol + \beta_{17} WitnessIPV) \end{aligned}$$

The results from the regression analyses are reported in Tables 2–4. In the initial model in Table 2 with $IPV_{General}$ as the dependent variable, we find support for Proposition 1.1 related to the HBM insofar as women who are employed (W_{Emp}), and women who have their own money ($W_{\$}$), are less likely to experience IPV; and we also find support for Proposition 1.2, given that *Education* and *Urban* are associated with a negative likelihood

Table 2 Logistic regression of factors associated with IPV

| | <i>IPV</i> | <i>Physical IPV</i> | <i>Sexual IPV</i> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <i>W_{Emp}</i> | 0.74* (0.12) | 0.73* (0.12) | 0.83 (0.21) |
| <i>W_{\$}</i> | 0.69** (0.10) | 0.71** (0.11) | 0.88 (0.20) |
| <i>W_{\$}\$</i> | 1.54** (0.47) | 1.54** (0.28) | 1.64* (0.42) |
| <i>Own Home</i> | 0.82 (0.11) | 0.77* (0.11) | 1.46* (0.31) |
| <i>Own Land</i> | 1.27 (0.26) | 1.22 (0.26) | 1.39 (0.44) |
| <i>Poor</i> | 1.15 (0.21) | 1.19 (0.22) | 1.19 (0.33) |
| <i>Rich</i> | 0.74 (0.15) | 0.76 (0.15) | 0.74 (0.25) |
| <i>OrgWomen</i> | 1.14 (0.30) | 1.30 (0.36) | 0.36 (0.28) |
| <i>OrgPolitical</i> | 2.92*** (1.04) | 2.01* (0.76) | 2.03 (1.60) |
| <i>Education</i> | 0.95** (0.02) | 0.95** (0.02) | 0.98 (0.02) |
| <i>Woman Head</i> | 0.86 (0.14) | 0.83 (0.14) | 0.68 (0.21) |
| <i>Urban</i> | 0.77* (0.11) | 0.87 (0.13) | 0.44*** (0.10) |
| <i>AgeDiff₋₅</i> | 0.82 (0.15) | 0.79 (0.15) | 1.07 (0.31) |
| <i>AgeDiff₉₊</i> | 0.81 (0.14) | 0.73** (0.13) | 0.89 (0.24) |
| <i>Alcohol</i> | 8.80*** (1.72) | 8.72*** (1.70) | 7.44*** (1.85) |
| <i>WitnessIPV</i> | 2.30*** (0.37) | 2.31*** (0.37) | 1.28 (0.35) |
| <i>N</i> | 1,820 | 1,820 | 1,818 |
| McFadden's <i>R</i> ² | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 |

Notes: Main cell values are odds ratios; robust standard errors (RSEs) are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

of experiencing IPV, and these relationships are all statistically significant. Just as in the cross-tabs reported in Table 1, the findings from Table 2 reveal support for the MBM as well. For example, we find that women who make more money than their husbands (*W_{\$}\$*) have a higher odds

BARGAINING OR BACKLASH?

Table 3 Logistic regression of factors associated with IPV (asset-rich women)

| | <i>IPV</i> | <i>Physical IPV</i> | <i>Sexual IPV</i> |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| <i>W_{Emp}</i> | 1.96 (1.08) | 2.41 (1.44) | 2.75 (2.35) |
| <i>W_{\$}</i> | 0.35** (0.16) | 0.35** (0.16) | 0.59 (0.43) |
| <i>W_{\$}\$</i> | 1.23 (0.63) | 1.21 (0.70) | 0.78 (0.63) |
| <i>Own Home</i> | 0.78 (0.17) | 0.74 (0.17) | 1.11 (0.38) |
| <i>Own Land</i> | 1.80** (0.53) | 1.83** (.55) | 2.51** (1.06) |
| <i>OrgWomen</i> | 1.88 (1.02) | 2.33** (1.20) | Variable omitted |
| <i>OrgPolitical</i> | 8.38** (7.29) | 2.99 (3.33) | 14.66** (18.28) |
| <i>Education</i> | 0.90** (0.04) | 0.91* (0.04) | 0.83*** (0.04) |
| <i>Woman Head</i> | 1.27 (0.52) | 1.22 (0.51) | 0.39 (0.29) |
| <i>Urban</i> | 0.77 (0.33) | 0.83 (0.37) | 0.42 (0.27) |
| <i>AgeDiff₋₅</i> | 0.69 (0.38) | 0.70 (0.38) | 0.42 (0.36) |
| <i>AgeDiff₉₊</i> | 0.32 (0.16) | 0.28** (0.14) | 0.17 (0.15) |
| <i>Alcohol</i> | 4.96** (3.08) | 5.01* (3.06) | 2.22 (2.21) |
| <i>WitnessIPV</i> | 3.51*** (1.66) | 3.26** (1.55) | 0.99 (0.74) |
| <i>N</i> | 654 | 654 | 621 |
| <i>McFadden's R²</i> | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.15 |

Notes: Main cell values are odds ratios; RSEs are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

ratio of experiencing IPV than women who make the same amount or less than their husbands, which supports Proposition 2.1. Women who belong to a political organization (*OrgPolitical*) have a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV than women who do not belong to political organizations, which supports Proposition 2.2. Several demographic variables are also significant. For example, women whose husbands drink alcohol often

Table 4 Logistic regression of factors associated with IPV (asset-poor women)

| | <i>IPV</i> | <i>Physical IPV</i> | <i>Sexual IPV</i> |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| W_{Emp} | 0.44*** (0.13) | 0.40*** (0.12) | 1.02 (0.56) |
| $W_{\$}$ | 0.13 (0.19) | 0.69 (0.20) | 0.52 (0.21) |
| $W_{\$\$}$ | 2.49** (0.92) | 2.47** (0.94) | 3.12** (1.60) |
| <i>Own Home</i> | 0.88 (0.26) | 0.84 (0.25) | 1.01 (0.35) |
| <i>Own Land</i> | 0.73 (0.33) | 0.54 (0.25) | 1.73 (0.96) |
| <i>OrgWomen</i> | 0.38 (0.23) | 0.45 (0.27) | 0.33 (0.27) |
| <i>OrgPolitical</i> | 10.40*** (6.22) | 8.04*** (4.94) | 0.73 (1.01) |
| <i>Education</i> | 0.98 (0.03) | 0.78 (0.22) | 1.00 (0.06) |
| <i>Woman Head</i> | 0.64 (0.23) | 0.61 (0.22) | 0.42 (0.28) |
| <i>Urban</i> | 0.71 (0.19) | 0.78 (0.21) | 0.47* (0.19) |
| <i>AgeDiff₅</i> | 0.87 (0.33) | 0.86 (0.34) | 0.90 (0.45) |
| <i>AgeDiff₉₊</i> | 0.65 (0.21) | 0.62 (0.21) | 0.83 (0.50) |
| <i>Alcohol</i> | 11.02*** (4.46) | 11.61*** (4.66) | 6.10*** (2.56) |
| <i>WitnessIPV</i> | 2.75*** (1.00) | 2.92*** (1.07) | 1.481 (0.91) |
| <i>N</i> | 761 | 761 | 760 |
| McFadden's R^2 | 0.1269 | 0.1377 | 0.1100 |

Notes: Main cell values are odds ratios; RSEs are in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

(*Alcohol*) and women who witnessed their fathers abuse their mothers (*WitnessIPV*) are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV than women who report the opposite circumstances.

Disaggregating IPV, focusing on physical violence as the dependent variable, we find support for the HBM. For example, both W_{Emp} and $W_{\$}$ are associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV, as is higher levels of *Education*. As was the case in the analysis of $IPV_{General}$, our examination

of the correlates of $IPV_{Physical}$ reveals support for the MBM as well. For example, when the wife makes more money than her husband ($W_{\$}$), she has a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV. Similarly, when she is a member of a political organization ($Org_{Political}$), she also faces a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV. Women with large age differences with their husbands ($AgeDiff_{9+}$) have a lower odds ratio of experiencing $IPV_{Physical}$. As with $IPV_{General}$, positive values of $Alcohol$ and $WitnessIPV$ are associated with a higher odds ratio of $IPV_{Physical}$.

Turning to the analysis of IPV_{Sexual} , there seems to be clearer support for the MBM. For example, women who make more money than their husbands are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV_{Sexual} than women who make the same amount of money or less than their husbands. In the case of IPV_{Sexual} , the only statistically significant economic variables, $W_{\$}$ and $Own\ Home$, lend greater support for the MBM than the HBM. The finding that male backlash in response to women's economic independence is implicated in IPV_{Sexual} , in particular, supports the arguments of feminist scholars who maintain that men often use sexual violence as a tool to reinforce masculinity (Browne 1987; MacKinnon 1989; Hattery 2009). To the extent that there is empirical support for the HBM in the case of IPV_{Sexual} , we find that women who live in urban areas ($Urban$) have a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV than women who live in rural areas, which is consistent with the augmented version of the HBM to the extent that in urban areas, women have more potential outside work and educational opportunities, which strengthens their bargaining power and provides more potential exit options. Also, as in the results for $IPV_{Physical}$, we find that $Alcohol$ is associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV.

In the logit analyses up to this point, we utilized two variables, $Poor$ and $Rich$, to capture the impact of economic class on the IPV variables; but neither odds ratio associated with $Poor$ or $Rich$ are statistically significant in any of the three equations. Considering the powerful theoretical argument regarding the impact of class on women's experience with IPV, then in the following tables, instead of aggregating women of all classes together, we report statistical results based on separate regressions differentiating asset-rich and asset-poor women.

Table 3 reports the results with respect to asset-rich women. We find that for $IPV_{General}$, among the only significant economic variables, $W_{\$}$ is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV. That is, women who have independent access to the most liquid financial asset have a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV than women who do not, which supports the HBM. Interestingly, as will be evident below, this variable was not significant in any of the specifications of asset-poor women. This contrast suggests that exit options must be substantial to be viable; asset-rich women who have money at their disposal are likely to have more of it than asset-poor

women, and therefore have greater ability to support themselves and their dependents alone.

While the findings suggest the utility of distinguishing between asset-rich and asset-poor respondents, this specification does not provide unequivocal support for the HBM because the other significant economic variable, a woman's ownership of land, increases the log odds of her experiencing IPV, which is inconsistent with the HBM. A similar contrast is evident with respect to the non-economic variables insofar as *Education* is associated with a decreased log odds of IPV, while *OrgPolitical* is associated with an increased log odds of IPV. The former supports Proposition 1.2, which is the augmented version of the HBM, while the latter supports Proposition 2.2, which is the augmented version of the MBM. We also find that *Alcohol* and *WitnessIPV* are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV.

Turning to *IPVPhysical*, $W_{\$}$ and *Education* are associated with a lower odds ratio of IPV for asset-rich women, which supports the HBM, while *Own Land* and *OrgWomen* are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV – neither of which supports the HBM, and the latter clearly supports the augmented MBM. Also, as in the previous results, we find that *AgeDiff9+* is associated with a lower odds ratio of *IPVPhysical*, while the relationship between *Alcohol* and *WitnessIPV* and *IPVPhysical* are the same as for *IPVGeneral*. With respect to *IPVSexual*, both *Own Land* and *OrgPolitical* are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV, while *Education* is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV.

Turning to the analyses for asset-poor women (Table 4), the MBM more than the HBM seems to account for their experience of IPV. For example, with respect to *IPVGeneral*, both $W_{\$}$ and *OrgPolitical* increase the odds ratio of experiencing IPV; and both of these relationships are indicative of the ways that increases in poor women's outside opportunities – both economic and sociopolitical – inadvertently encourage precarious situations within the household. These relationships support both the basic and augmented forms of the MBM and seem to reflect the “perverse consequences” of development – at least for poorer women (Panda and Agarwal 2005); however, there is limited support for the HBM, as well. For example, we find that W_{Emp} is associated with a lower odds ratio of IPV, which suggests the dampening impact of women's employment on IPV. Both social variables *Alcohol* and *WitnessIPV* place asset-poor women at a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV (these relationships hold for *IPVPhysical* as well, but only the former for *IPVSexual*). Similarly, with respect to *IPVPhysical*, there is support for the MBM, given that both $W_{\$}$ and *OrgPolitical* are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV; but there is also support for the HBM insofar as W_{Emp} is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV. Turning to *IPVSexual*, the only significant economic predictor is $W_{\$}$; specifically, when asset-poor women make more money than their husbands, they are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing IPV.

However, living in an urban area (*Urban*) puts asset-poor women at a lower odds ratio of experiencing IPV_{Sexual} than asset-poor women in rural areas, which supports the augmented HBM.

In sum, while the findings that differentiate between asset-rich and asset-poor women allow us to capture the impact of class on IPV in the DR, they also do not provide unequivocal – or exclusive – support for propositions of either the HBM or MBM; instead, the results up to this point suggest the salience of both models in explicating IPV. In addition, we find that both models' salience varies with respect to the type of IPV focused on and whether respondents are wealthier or poorer. While such variation is not unexpected, in what follows, we attempt to discern the relative predictive capacity of the HBM and MBM by determining the impact of the key variables in each of the models.

DISCUSSION

The results in Tables 2–4 support propositions from both the HBM and MBM, which is demonstrated through the statistical significance of the variables associated with these propositions. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that statistical significance of the coefficient estimates does not convey their substantive impact on the outcome. We can ascertain the substantive effect of each of the significant variables in the models by estimating the predicted probabilities of the outcome associated with each of the predictor variables (Long and Freese 2006). We provide estimates of the predicted probabilities along with their confidence intervals for each of the significant variables from the results reported in Tables 3 and 4. We delineate the predicted probabilities of IPV for asset-rich and asset-poor women, respectively, holding the remaining continuous and dichotomous variables in the original equations at their mean or modal values. It is useful to examine the predicted probabilities not simply in isolation, but with respect to variable values that represent meaningful relationships in the referent cases we are examining. Clearly, economic class is an important line of demarcation – thus our separate estimates for asset-rich and asset-poor women; and in the DR, the urban/rural divide is also salient, so we distinguish between those contexts, as well.

The results reinforce the previous findings of a class division between women's experience of IPV, and they also demonstrate that the theoretical models used to explain IPV perform differently with respect to this divide. That is, the HBM seems to better account for IPV experienced by wealthier women, and the MBM better accounts for IPV among poorer women.⁶ These relationships are further vitiated by economic, demographic, and sociopolitical factors. For example, *ceteris paribus*, asset-poor urban women who are unemployed ($W_{Emp} = 0$) have a 27 percent predicted probability of experiencing IPV, with the 95 percent confidence interval lying between

0.14 and 0.40, while asset-poor urban employed women ($W_{Emp} = 1$) have little more than half (15 percent) the predicted probability of IPV of compared to their unemployed counterpart. The predicted probability of rural unemployed asset-poor women experiencing IPV is 34 percent with a 95 percent confidence interval between 0.19 and 0.49, while employed rural women have little more than half (18 percent) the predicted probability of experiencing IPV. The results from Table 4 suggest the need for viable employment opportunities for poor women, especially in rural areas. Employment serves not only the obvious purpose of providing a woman with income, increasing her ability to provide for her household and to contribute to market activity, and likely increasing her level of self-esteem, but employment that pays a living wage also provides a potential exit option, buttressing her ability to deter IPV, as suggested by the HBM.

While employment seems to deter IPV, if women earn more money than their husbands ($W_{\$} = 1$), then their probability of experiencing IPV increases dramatically. For example, urban women who report making more money than their husbands have a 29 percent probability of experiencing IPV, which is almost twice the probability (15 percent) of IPV of urban women who do not earn more than their husbands ($W_{\$} = 0$). Rural women who make more than their husbands have a 36 percent probability of experiencing IPV, whereas their counterparts who earn the same or less have half that (18 percent). This outcome, in which women have a higher probability of experiencing IPV when they make more money than their husbands, is consistent with the MBM and is an example of Agarwal and Panda's (2007) perverse effects of development. Women's movement from the home to the workplace appears to challenge gender norms and simultaneously upset the gender hierarchy in the home. The resulting tensions may culminate in IPV, as men attempt to (re)assert their dominance, as the MBM suggests. Our findings are consistent with previous studies that found that women who experienced IPV were significantly less likely to maintain employment (Browne, Salomon, and Bassuk 1999) or were likely to have unstable employment (Crowne et al. 2011). Andrea Borchers et al. (2016) found that although women who experienced IPV could obtain employment, they had great difficulty maintaining employment in the face of their perpetrator sabotaging or interfering with their work, controlling their appearance, or controlling their finances.

Similar male backlash processes are apparent in the case of asset-poor women who are members of political organizations. Urban women who are members of political organizations have more than four times the probability of experiencing IPV (63 percent) as compared to women who are not involved in political organizations (15 percent).⁷ Rural women who are politically active have an even higher predicted probability of

experiencing IPV of 70 percent, as compared to rural women who are not members of a political organization (15 percent). In the case of women's political activism, it could be that husbands want to punish their wives for entering the public sphere, which is often viewed as a male-only space, thereby using IPV – as the augmented MBM suggests – to assert for themselves and to others that they are still dominant over their wives. It could also be that women who become politicized more readily acknowledge their experience with IPV given that the dominance of social norms is such that many women may not even recognize their abuse as IPV until they become more politically active. In either case, women's political organization seems to generate the backlash that the MBM anticipates.

In urban areas, women reporting witnessing IPV in their homes as children have a 31 percent probability of experiencing violence themselves, but those in urban areas who have not witnessed domestic violence have less than half the probability of experiencing IPV (15 percent). In rural areas, the predicted probability of IPV for women who witnessed abuse in the childhood home is 39 percent. Similarly, rural women who did not observe domestic violence growing up have a probability of 18 percent. These percentages point to the need for social policy that seeks to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of gender violence, as well as for economic policy that disrupts the violence of poverty. Social policies are needed to break down the perceived normalcy of men using violence against women and to confront the pervasive underlying notion in masculinist thought and cultures of machismo that women are objects to be controlled.

The asset-poor women who have the highest probability of experiencing IPV are those who report that their husbands often drink alcohol (64 percent in urban areas and 72 percent in rural areas). Conversely, the probability for women whose partners do not drink alcohol often is 14 percent in urban areas and 17 percent in rural areas, respectively. Policies to alleviate this situation include national- and grassroots-level social and educational alcohol-awareness programs that stress that alcohol abuse is often associated with IPV. Such widespread initiatives are necessary to offset the enduring sexist proclivities evident throughout Dominican society, especially with respect to responses to IPV. For example, the political culture in the DR is such that even prominent politicians and political pundits openly broadcast sexist rhetoric. Moreover, when women in the DR report IPV to the police, they are routinely told to “give your husband time to calm down” and are advised to go to a family member's home. Although Dominican women have organized and mobilized in political organizations to transform the political culture of the country, including the view of the acceptability of IPV, it is troubling that women who join political organizations face a heightened risk of IPV.

With respect to the predicted probabilities of asset-rich women experiencing IPV, they are considerably lower than the corresponding probabilities for asset-poor women. For example, for asset-rich women, having money for their own use is associated with a lower likelihood of experiencing IPV. That is, asset-rich urban women who have money for their own use have a 5 percent probability of experiencing IPV, while those without it are almost three times as likely to experience IPV (14 percent). These relationships are also evident for rural women, who have a 7 percent probability of IPV when they have money for their own use and more than twice as high a probability of IPV when they do not (18 percent). It is important to note that the consistently and significantly lower probabilities of wealthier women reporting experiences of IPV as compared to poorer women may be less a function of an actual decreased incidence of IPV among this class than a result of systematic underreporting of IPV for wealthier women due to stigma associated with spousal abuse. It may also reflect the prevalent elitist notion that IPV is a malady of lower classes that rarely occurs in the homes of the wealthy and educated. Given the likelihood of underreporting, it is crucial to suggest policies that address the importance of reducing the levels of IPV that are being reported. For example, relevant policy initiatives would include personal financial information campaigns by public welfare agencies as well as private stakeholders such as banks (for example, Banco de la Mujer in the DR), which can play a role in educating women and providing them with incentives to save money for their own use and to develop greater financial literacy. Importantly, asset-rich women need to have economic autonomy, just as the HBM suggests, to increase the feasibility of their exit options in order to deter IPV. But the MBM is also salient for understanding the IPV of asset-rich women. For example, asset-rich women with the highest probabilities of IPV are those who are members of political organizations and those whose husbands often drink (two risk factors they share with asset-poor women). These relationships tend to support the augmented MBM. The latter conjunction speaks to the ways that IPV cuts across class lines and suggests that similar social and educational policies would benefit women in general, regardless of class.⁸

CONCLUSION

In this study, we examined whether the HBM or the MBM best accounts for intimate partner violence in the Dominican Republic. The results were mixed when we examined IPV in general, but when we distinguish between types of IPV, we found that the HBM better accounts for physical IPV, while the MBM better accounts for sexual IPV. We also found that the HBM performs better with respect to IPV among asset-poor

women, while the MBM does better in accounting for IPV among asset-poor women. The findings suggest that if we are to reduce women's likelihood of experiencing IPV, women must have viable exit options, such as employment that pays a living wage. However, as Lambert notes, in 2007 the "unemployment rate for those actively seeking jobs [wa]s twice as high for women as for men" (2009: 17), and women's average wage was only 87 percent that of men, despite women's higher levels of educational attainment as compared to men. The gender gap in economic participation in DR persists (World Economic Forum [WEF] 2013: 187). Additionally, women are more likely to be employed in the informal sector, which tends to include the lowest-paying, most labor-intensive work that does not offer benefits, pension, healthcare, or job security (Safa 1995; Lambert 2009). These larger macroeconomic structural issues severely limit women's, particularly asset-poor women's, exit options from violent relationships.

The findings also suggest that initiatives to provide greater exit options for women should be mediated by the need to counterbalance the "perverse effects" of women's economic autonomy against which the MBM warns. Thus, national and grassroots initiatives are needed to challenge the sexist norms that rationalize gender violence among men – and these are especially necessary for the police and policymakers, as well as prospective abusers. While women should be educated and provided with practical training to enhance their exit options, the perpetrators of IPV and potential abusers should also be targeted for both prevention and intervention. Too often, policies are directed at women as if they are the perpetrators instead of the grossly disproportionate victims and survivors of incidents of IPV. Related social and education policies are necessary to enhance awareness of the implications of alcohol abuse for violence in the home, as well as the cross-generational impact of IPV. In sum, our findings that both the HBM and the MBM help explain the incidence of intimate partner violence in the DR suggest that both economic and sociopolitical factors are implicated in IPV; therefore, policies to eradicate IPV in the DR must similarly attend to both the economic and sociopolitical factors that help generate it.

Cruz Caridad Bueno

*SUNY New Paltz, Black Studies Department
1 Hawk Drive, New Paltz, NY 12561-2443, USA
e-mail: buenoc@newpaltz.edu*

Errol A. Henderson

*Pennsylvania State University, Department of Political Science
University Park, PA 16801, USA
e-mail: eah13@psu.edu*

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Cruz Caridad Bueno is Assistant Professor of Black Studies at the State University of New York, New Paltz. She is an economist specializing in economic development and the political economy of race, gender, and class inequality. She is recipient of the 2014 Rhonda Williams Prize from the International Association for Feminist Economics for her research on low-income black women workers and the correlates of gender violence in the Dominican Republic.

Errol A. Henderson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Pennsylvania State University, where he teaches international relations, US foreign policy, the analysis of war and peace, and African politics. He has authored more than thirty scholarly publications including his latest book, *African Realism? International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

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NOTES

- ¹ There are overlaps between the models given that the ability to engage in household bargaining that results from employment or home ownership may motivate male backlash, which, in turn, may motivate IPV to undermine a woman's ability to maintain employment that she might leverage into household bargaining. Nevertheless, our argument is not that these are completely independent processes, but that they can be usefully distinguished; and to the extent that they can, there is value added in determining which process is more prevalent in IPV in the DR.
- ² Finnoff (2010) also found that regions in Rwanda with higher levels of violence prior to the genocide had greater male backlash and a higher incidence of sexual violence afterward.
- ³ These questions were: Has your (last) husband/partner ever: Pushed, shaken, or thrown something at you? Hit you? Twisted your arm or pulled your hair? Punched you with his fist or with something that could hurt you? Kicked or dragged you across the floor? Tried to strangle or burn you? Threatened or hurt you with a knife, gun, or other weapon? Used physical force to have sexual relations although you did not want to engage in sexual intercourse? Forced you to engage in sexual acts that you do not approve of?
- ⁴ With respect to the former, Hattery notes that "IPV is not structured only by a system of patriarchy," but "[i]t is also structured by a system of racial superiority and capitalism and of the intersections of these systems with patriarchy" (2009: 8). Regarding the latter, it is important to appreciate that systematic underreporting of IPV may be exacerbated for women due to the stigma associated with it that is

reinforced by factors related not only to gender but to class, for example, such that wealthier women may report less IPV than they actually experience because of elitist views that IPV is more a problem of the poor.

- ⁵ Apart from the view that poverty may be a form of economic violence, some studies suggest that the higher incidence of IPV among the poor may be associated with the immediate psychological and material stresses of poverty (Heise 1998; Panda and Agarwal 2005).
- ⁶ Asset wealth data are assessed by household items, type of house, and other items owned at the household level.
- ⁷ Of the forty-one women in political organizations included in the data, sixteen are in the asset-poor category, thirteen in the middle asset category, and twelve in the asset-rich category.
- ⁸ Nevertheless, it is important to note, as Kimberlé Crenshaw does, that

[w]here systems of race, gender, and class domination converge, as they do in the experiences of battered women of color, intervention strategies based solely on the experiences of women who do not share the same class or race backgrounds will be of limited help to women who because of race and class face different obstacles (1991: 1246).

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